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OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
 
HUTCHINSON, Circuit Judge. 
 
 
 Appellant, Debra Hook ("Hook"), appeals a judgment the 
United States District Court for the Western District of 
Pennsylvania entered on a jury verdict for her former employer 
appellee Ernst & Young.  Hook claims Ernst & Young intentionally 
discriminated against her on the basis of sex in violation of 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), 42 
U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (West 1981 & Supp. 1993), when it 
terminated her employment.  On appeal, she contends that she was 
entitled to a mixed-motives burden shifting jury instruction 
under the 1991 amendments to Title VII and Price Waterhouse v. 
Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989), and therefore the court erred in 
charging the jury that it was her burden to show that sex was a 
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"determinative" rather than a "motivating" factor in the decision 
to terminate her. 
 More specifically, Hook argues section 107(a) of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1991 ("the 1991 Act"), codified at 42 
U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(m) (West Supp. 1993), automatically entitles 
Title VII plaintiffs who make out a prima facie case of illegal 
discrimination on a pretext theory to a motivating factor mixed-
motives instruction.  If a mixed-motives instruction is not 
required when a Title VII plaintiff's case depends on pretext, 
Hook argues in the alternative that she was entitled to a mixed-
motives instruction because the evidence in this case showed the 
discriminatory animus Price Waterhouse requires. 
 We conclude that section 107 does not govern this case 
because that section does not apply to conduct occurring prior to 
its enactment in 1991.  We also conclude that Hook has not 
produced the kind of evidence that would entitle her to a mixed 
motives, burden shifting instruction under Price Waterhouse. 
 Finally, we reject Hook's argument that a mixed-motives 
instruction is required whenever there is circumstantial evidence 
sufficient to establish a prima facie case under McDonnell 
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) and Texas Department 
of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981).  We think a 
holding to that effect would be in conflict with the teaching of 
the United States Supreme Court in St. Mary's Honor Center v. 
Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2749 (1993).  That case holds that a 
plaintiff who seeks to establish illegal discrimination on a 
pretext theory must persuade the factfinder not only that illegal 
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discrimination or bias was present but also that it was a cause 
of the act on which her Title VII claim is based.  In contrast, a 
Price Waterhouse mixed-motives instruction, which requires 
evidence sufficient to show discriminatory animus more directly, 
implies cause and shifts to the employer the burden of persuading 
the factfinder its bias had, in fact, no causal connection with 
its act against the protected employee.  Thus, in a mixed-motives 
case the employer must negate causation, i.e., persuade the 
factfinder it would have acted as it did even if it were not 
invidiously prejudiced.  Therefore, we will affirm the district 
court's order entering judgment for Ernst & Young on the jury's 
verdict against Hook. 
 
I.  Factual & Procedural History 
 Arthur Young & Co. ("Arthur Young"), a major accounting 
firm, hired Hook in June of 1989 as a tax senior, its lowest 
supervisory position.  Hook had a law degree and work experience 
with another major accounting firm but was not a certified public 
accountant ("CPA").  At her job interview, Hook inquired when she 
might be eligible for promotion.  James Chemel ("Chemel"), the 
director of the section which would employ Hook, stated that she 
would be promoted to tax manager within six months. 
 On October 1, 1989, Arthur Young merged with Ernst & 
Whinney to become Ernst & Young.  After the merger, Chemel told 
Hook that the merger prevented him from promoting her to tax 
manager within the six months he had promised.  Ernst & Young 
soon replaced Chemel with John McCann ("McCann").  He told Hook 
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that Ernst & Young preferred CPA's for promotion to that 
position.  A little later the staff in Ernst & Young's Pittsburgh 
office received a memorandum.  It stated that any person who 
sought promotion to tax manager had to pass the CPA examination. 
This new policy had a grandfather clause excusing employees like 
Hook from the CPA requirement. 
 Ernst & Young rates its employees on a scale of one to 
five.  Five indicates the employee "consistently excels" but one 
indicates "unacceptable" performance.  As Hook continued at 
Ernst & Young, her performance reviews started to go downhill. In 
her first written evaluation in April of 1990 Hook received four 
"2s," three "3s," and one "4."  At her next evaluation in April 
of 1991 Hook received three "1s," two "2s," and one "3" from 
Chemel.  She received equally low ratings from McCann, her 
supervisor when she was terminated. 
 During the 1990 economic down-turn, Ernst & Young 
suffered a considerable loss of business and decided to reduce 
its workforce.  Between March and June of 1990 it fired seven 
members of its tax staff, six men and one woman.  In February 
1991 Ernst & Young continued to contract its workforce and fired 
two more professionals from its tax staff. 
 In April 1991 McCann informed Hook she would be 
terminated because her projects were subject to "time overruns" 
and "she was the least good of those who were left."  Joint 
Appendix ("Jt. App.") at 452A. Two other tax professionals, one 
male and one female, were also fired at the same time. 
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 Ernst & Young continued to cut back through early 1992 
and many employees left the firm voluntarily.  Of the fifty-five 
professionals Ernst & Young had employed in its Pittsburgh tax 
department at the time of the merger in October 1989, only 
twenty-two remained by November 1992.  Sixteen of the thirty-
three employees who were gone had been dismissed; four of the 
sixteen were women. 
 In December 1991 Hook sued Ernst & Young under 
Title VII alleging it intentionally discriminated against her 
because of sex when it terminated her.1  At trial, Hook testified 
to three comments she found offensive.  From them she seeks to 
infer that her supervisor, McCann, had a sexually discriminatory 
animus.  She testified that on one occasion a client asked her 
how she could get out of her blouse because it buttoned in the 
back, to which McCann is said to have replied that he had 
buttoned it for her that morning.  On a separate occasion, McCann 
allegedly told Hook she should "get [her] legs and ass over" to 
the client.  Jt. App. at 148A.  Hook testified McCann made one 
other "demeaning" remark but she was unable to recall the exact 
words, only the embarrassment it caused her. 
 Hook testified her work was of high quality.  She also 
testified that Peter Stipanovich, another tax manager who was 
                     
1Hook also alleged violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act as 
amended by the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 201-219 (West 1965, 
1978, 1985  & Supp. 1993), and the Pennsylvania Equal Pay Law, 
Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 43, §§ 336.1-336.10 (1992).  Ernst & Young 
removed the case to federal court.  The district court entered 
judgment as a matter of law in favor of Ernst & Young on these 
claims at the close of Hook's case.  Those orders are not 
appealed. 
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retained, was less qualified than she was and said two Ernst & 
Young partners had admitted she was better than Stipanovich.  Her 
testimony that the Ernst & Young partners agreed with her about 
Stipanovich's relative merit was uncorroborated, and the Ernst & 
Young supervisors who testified all said Stipanovich was an able 
professional with good credentials.  In particular, Adam S. Monks 
("Monks"), an Ernst & Young partner, testified that Stipanovich 
was "very knowledgable [sic] about and is considered one of the 
most knowledgable [sic] in the office" on taxation of 
partnerships.  Id. at 383A.  Similarly, Chemel testified that 
Stipanovich was "above average" in competence, ability and work 
performance.  Id. at 402A.  The record also shows Stipanovich was 
a CPA with a degree from the University of Pennsylvania's Wharton 
School of Business. 
 After the close of all evidence, in conference with the 
parties, the court proposed the following jury charge: 
 The question for you, members of the 
jury, is whether plaintiff's sex was a 
determinative factor in the discharge of 
plaintiff. . . .  Plaintiff need not prove 
that her sex was the sole factor motivating 
the defendant.  However, plaintiff must prove 
that she would not have been discharged if 
the fact that she is a woman had not been 
taken into account. 
 
 The issue you are to decide is whether 
plaintiff's sex was a determinative factor in 
the defendant's discharge of plaintiff.  The 
issue is not whether the plaintiff was 
treated fairly or whether there was a 
personality conflict between the plaintiff 
and her superiors or whether she was treated 
differently than other employees or whether 
the defendant made sound management 
decisions. 
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 You are not to decide whether you agree 
or disagree with the defendant's actions. You 
are to decide whether plaintiff's sex was a 
determinative factor in defendant's discharge 
of plaintiff. 
 
 If you find that the defendant 
discharged plaintiff for reasons in which her 
sex was not a determinative factor, then you 
must return a verdict in favor of defendant. 
 
 
Id. at 503A-05A (emphasis added).  Hook objected to this proposed 
charge and argued that in all Title VII individual discrimination 
cases, the prohibited consideration need only be a "motivating" 
rather than a "determinative" factor under section 107(a) of the 
1991 Act.  Hook requested a point for charge stating "[a]n 
unlawful employment practice is established when the complaining 
party establishes that sex was a motivating factor in the 
decision to terminate that complaining party's employment even 
though other factors motivated the practice."  Brief for 
Appellant at 10 n.4 (emphasis added).  The district court stated 
it was granting Hook's point "in other words," Jt. App. at 500A, 
but denied her request to change the proposed charge.  The court 
later observed that Ernst & Young defended the case solely on a 
pretext theory and a "motivating factor" instruction was only 
appropriate in a mixed-motives case.  Id. at 508A. 
 During deliberations, the jury asked the court to 
"define . . . the precise meaning of . . . determinative factor." 
Id. at 552A.  In response, the district court repeated its charge 
and then added "[t]he term 'determinative factor' as used in your 
instructions, means a factor that is causally connected to the 
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result; in this case, the discharge of plaintiff.  It need not be 
the sole cause of the result, since multiple factors might cause 
a particular result."  Id. at 553A (emphasis added).  The jury 
returned a verdict in favor of Ernst & Young.  After her post-
trial motions including her motion for new trial were denied, 
Hook filed a timely notice of appeal. 
 
II.  Jurisdiction & Standard of Review 
 The district court had subject matter jurisdiction over 
Hook's claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 1331 (West 1993) and 42 
U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(f)(3).  We have appellate jurisdiction over 
the appeal from the final order of the district court pursuant to 
28 U.S.C.A. § 1291 (West 1993). 
 Normally we review a district court's denial of a 
motion for a new trial for abuse of discretion, but where the 
denial of the motion was based on the application of legal 
precepts we exercise plenary review.  Griffiths v. CIGNA Corp., 
988 F.2d 457, 462 (3d Cir.) (citing Rotondo v. Keene Corp., 956 
F.2d 436, 438 (3d Cir. 1992)), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 186 
(1993).  Similarly, while we ordinarily review a district court's 
rulings on points for charge for abuse of discretion, Link v. 
Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., Inc., 788 F.2d 918, 922 (3d Cir. 1986), 
we exercise plenary review where the appellant contends that the 
charge does not state the correct legal standard.  Griffiths, 988 
F.2d at 462 (citing Savarese v. Agriss, 883 F.2d 1194, 1202 (3d 
Cir. 1989)).  Where a jury charge is attacked for legal error we 
must determine whether "the charge [taken] as a whole fairly and 
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adequately submits the issues in the case to the jury."  Bennis 
v. Gable, 823 F.2d 723, 727 (3d Cir. 1987).  We will reverse 
"'only if the instruction was capable of confusing and thereby 
misleading the jury.'"  Id. (citation omitted); see also 
Griffiths, 988 F.2d at 462. 
 
III. 
 Hook contends she was entitled to an instruction using 
the words "motivating factor" based on section 107(a) of the 1991 
Act.  The 1991 Act amended 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2 by adding a new 
subsection.  Section 107(a), codified at section 2000e-2(m), 
provides: 
(m)  Motivations for practice 
 
 Except as otherwise provided in this 
subchapter, an unlawful employment practice 
is established when the complaining party 
demonstrates that . . . sex . . . was a 
motivating factor for any employment 
practice, even though other factors also 
motivated the practice. 
 
 
42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2 (emphasis added).  Portions of the 
legislative history indicate a purpose of this amendment was to 
partially overrule that part of Price Waterhouse which exempted 
employers from liability and precluded any Title VII remedy if 
they could produce evidence and persuade a factfinder that an 
adverse employment decision would have been made regardless of 
the fact that a discriminatory motive was one of the factors 
influencing the decision.  Thus, as the House Report states: 
 When Congress enacted the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, it precluded all invidious 
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consideration of a person's race, color, 
religion, sex or national origin in 
employment.  The effectiveness of Title VII's 
ban on discrimination on the basis of race, 
color, religion, sex or national origin has 
been severely undercut by the recent Supreme 
Court decision in Price Waterhouse v. 
Hopkins, 109 S.Ct. 1775 (1989).  In that 
case, the Supreme Court concluded that "when 
a plaintiff . . . proves that her gender 
played a motivating part in an employment 
decision, the defendant may avoid a finding 
of liability . . . by proving by a 
preponderance of the evidence that it would 
have made the same decision even if it had 
not taken the plaintiff's gender into 
account."  Id. at 1795 (emphasis added).  
 
*    *    * 
 
To establish liability under proposed 
Subsection 703(1), the complaining party must 
demonstrate that discrimination actually 
contributed or was otherwise a factor in an 
employment decision or action.  Thus, in 
providing liability for discrimination that 
is a "contributing factor," the Committee 
intends to restore the rule applied in many 
federal circuits prior to the Price 
Waterhouse decision that an employer may be 
held liable for any discrimination that is 
actually shown to play a role in a contested 
employment decision. 
 
 Section 203 of the bill also amends 
Subsection 706(g) of Title VII to make clear 
that where a violation is established under 
Subsection 703(1), and where the employer 
establishes that it would have taken the same 
action in the absence of any discrimination, 
a court may not order the employer to hire, 
reinstate, promote or provide back pay to the 
complainant.  This provision is consistent 
with the current text of Title VII, which 
provides that "no order of the court shall 
require the admission or reinstatement of an 
individual . . . if such individual . . . was 
refused employment . . . for any reason other 
than discrimination."  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
5(g). 
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*    *    * 
 
However, the presence of a contributing 
discriminatory factor would still establish a 
Title VII violation, and a court could order 
other appropriate relief, including 
injunctive or declaratory relief, 
compensatory and punitive damages where 
appropriate, and attorney's fees. 
 
 
H.R. Rep. No. 102-40(I), 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 45, 48-49, 
reprinted in, 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 583, 586-87 (emphasis in 
original) (footnotes omitted). 
  Ernst & Young insists that Price Waterhouse and not     
section 107 provides the rule of decision in this case because 
that section is not to be applied in cases involving preenactment 
conduct.  We agree. 
 The Supreme Court recently spoke to the retroactivity 
issue in the context of other portions of the 1991 amendments. 
Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 62 U.S.L.W. 4255 (Apr. 26, 1994) 
(Section 102); Rivers v. Roadway Express Inc., 62 U.S.L.W. 4271 
(Apr. 26, 1994) (Section 101).  Landgraf dealt with section 102 
which for the first time imposes liability for compensatory and 
punitive damages when a violation of Title VII has been shown. 
The Court gave the following instructions, which are pertinent 
here: 
 When a case implicates a federal statute 
enacted after the events in suit, the court's 
first task is to determine whether Congress 
has expressly prescribed the statute's proper 
reach.  If Congress has done so, of course, 
there is no need to resort to judicial 
default rules.  When, however, the statute 
contains no such express command, the court 
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must determine whether the new statute would 
have retroactive effect, i.e., whether it 
would impair rights a party possessed when he 
acted, increase a party's liability for past 
conduct, or impose new duties with respect to 
transactions already completed.  If the 
statute would operate retroactively, our 
traditional presumption teaches that it does 
not govern absent clear congressional intent 
favoring such a result. 
 
 
Landgraf, 62 U.S.L.W. at 4265-66. 
 Following this analysis, the Court in Landgraf first 
concluded that neither the text of the amendments nor the 
legislative history, with two exceptions not relevant, reflects 
Congress's intent on the issue of retroactivity.  Id. at 4260-61. 
"Instead, [the Court noted,] the history of the 1991 Act conveys 
the impression that legislators agreed to disagree about whether 
and to what extent the Act would apply to preenactment conduct." 
Id. at 4261. 
 Turning to section 102, the Court had no difficulty 
concluding that Congress's imposition of punitive damages should 
not be applied to preenactment conduct.  Id. at 4266. 
Compensatory damages, however, posed a more difficult issue: 
 The provision of § 102(a)(1) authorizing 
the recovery of compensatory damages is not 
easily classified.  It does not make unlawful 
conduct that was lawful when it occurred; as 
we have noted, supra, at 6-8, § 102 only 
reaches discriminatory conduct already 
prohibited by Title VII. 
 
*    *    * 
 
 Nonetheless, the new compensatory 
damages provision would operate 
"retrospectively" if it were applied to 
conduct occurring before November 21, 1991. 
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Unlike certain other forms of relief, 
compensatory damages are quintessentially 
backward-looking.  Compensatory damages may 
be intended less to sanction wrongdoers than 
to make victims whole, but they do so by a 
mechanism that affects the liabilities of 
defendants.  They do not "compensate" by 
distributing funds from the public coffers, 
but by requiring particular employers to pay 
for harms they caused.  The introduction of a 
right to compensatory damages is also the 
type of legal change that would have an 
impact on private parties' planning. 
 
*    *    * 
 
Because Title VII previously authorized 
recovery of backpay in some cases, and 
because compensatory damages under §102(a) 
are in addition to any backpay recoverable, 
the new provision also resembles a statute 
increasing the amount of damages available 
under a preestablished cause of action.  Even 
under that view, however, the provision 
would, if applied in cases arising before the 
Act's effective date, undoubtedly impose on 
employers found liable a "new disability" in 
respect to past events.  See Society for 
Propagation of the Gospel, 22 F. Cas., at 
767.  The extent of a party's liability, in 
the civil context as well as the criminal, is 
an important legal consequence that cannot be 
ignored. 
 
 
Id. at 4266-67 (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted).  The 
new provision regarding compensation was, therefore, held to 
apply only to conduct occurring after Congress passed the 1991 
Amendments. 
 In Rivers, the Court relied on Landgraf to conclude 
that section 101, which amended 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981 by defining 
the term "make and enforce contracts" broadly to embrace all 
phases of the contractual relationship including discriminatory 
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contract terminations, enlarges the category of conduct subject 
to section 1981 liability and therefore does not apply to cases 
pending when it was enacted.  Rivers, 62 U.S.L.W. at 4272.  The 
Court also rejected an argument that because Congress intended to 
alter the rule of law established in Patterson v. McLean Credit 
Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989), the amendment was restorative and the 
section should be applied retroactively.  Although restorative 
intent is apparent, such intent does not reveal whether Congress 
intended the amendment to apply retroactively.  Id. at 4272-75. 
 The Court's holdings in Landgraf and Rivers do not 
answer the question before us.  As the Court observed in 
Landgraf, "there is no special reason to think that all the 
diverse provisions of the Act must be treated uniformly for 
[these] purposes. . . .  [C]ourts should evaluate each provision 
of the Act in light of ordinary judicial principles concerning 
the application of new rules to pending cases and pre-enactment 
conduct."  Landgraf, 62 U.S.L.W. at 4266.  Landgraf and Rivers, 
however, do provide a basis for confident prediction regarding 
section 107. 
 As Justice Brennan in his plurality opinion in Price 
Waterhouse states, "[t]he specification of the standard of 
causation under Title VII is a decision about the kind of conduct 
that violates that statute."  Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 237. 
Section 107, by changing the standard of causation under Price 
Waterhouse, expands the types of conduct that violate the Act. 
Prior to section 107, an employer did not violate the Act if it 
considered an employee's protected trait when deciding to take an 
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adverse employment action, so long as it also considered other 
factors that would have caused it to make the same decision in 
the absence of the unlawful consideration.  After the enactment 
of section 107, an employer making exactly the same kind of 
decision could violate the Act.  This would change "the kind of 
conduct that violates th[e] statute."  Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. 
at 237.  Moreover, to the extent that section 107 is meant to be 
restorative of pre-Price Waterhouse law, our examination of the 
statutory language and the legislative history uncovers no 
indication that Congress intended the amendment to apply 
retroactively. 
 "Elementary considerations of fairness dictate that 
individuals should have an opportunity to know what the law is 
and to conform their conduct accordingly; settled expectations 
should not be lightly disrupted."  Landgraf, 62 U.S.L.W. at 4261 
(footnote omitted).  If an amendment imposing liability for 
compensatory damages for conduct already unlawful sufficiently 
disrupts settled expectations to foreclose retroactive 
application, so too does an amendment that renders previously 
lawful conduct unlawful.  Accordingly, Landgraf and Rivers 
preclude us from giving section 107 the retroactive application 
that Hook desires. 
 
IV.  Analysis under Price Waterhouse 
 Although the 1991 Amendment does not apply 
retroactively, we must still consider Hook's Price Waterhouse 
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argument that the district court should have granted her request 
for a mixed-motives burden-shifting charge.2 
 Whether a pretext or a mixed-motives case has been 
presented depends on the kind of circumstantial evidence the 
employee produces in support of her claim of illegal 
discrimination.  Not all evidence that is probative of 
discrimination entitles an employee to a Price Waterhouse mixed-
motives charge.  See Ostrowski v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Cos., 968 
F.2d 171, 181 (2d Cir. 1992).  Thus, in Price Waterhouse, Justice 
O'Connor stated in her concurrence that the employee has to show 
the employer's mixed motives by "direct evidence that an 
illegitimate criterion was a substantial factor in the decision." 
Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 276 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
Specifically, 
stray remarks in the workplace, while perhaps 
probative of sexual harassment, cannot 
justify requiring the employer to prove that 
its hiring or promotion decisions were based 
on legitimate criteria.  Nor can statements 
by nondecisionmakers, or statements by 
decisionmakers unrelated to the decisional 
process itself, suffice to satisfy the 
                     
2Ernst & Young argues Hook waived this issue because she did not 
raise it until supplemental points for charge were submitted. It 
notes the district court specifically declined to give Hook's 
mixed-motives instruction because mixed-motives was "not the 
position that the defendant has taken in this case at all."  Jt. 
App. at 508A.  A trial judge has discretion to decide what points 
for charge are appropriate based on the evidence presented by the 
parties during the trial.  See, e.g., Hinds v. General Motor 
Corp., 988 F.2d 1039, 1046 (10th Cir. 1993) (error for trial 
court to give instruction on theory not supported by competent 
evidence).  In the district court Ernst & Young failed to object 
to Hook's supplemental point for charge on the theory it now 
raises; therefore, Ernst & Young's waiver argument may itself be 
subject to waiver.  Fleck v. KDI Sylvan Pools, Inc., 981 F.2d 
107, 116 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1645 (1993). 
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plaintiff's burden in this regard. . . . [I]n 
the context of this case, a mere reference to 
"a lady candidate" might show that gender 
"played a role" in the decision, but by no 
means could support a rational factfinder's 
inference that the decision was made "because 
of" sex. 
 
 
Id. at 277 (O'Connor, J., concurring).  In Ostrowski the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit criticized the 
phrase "'direct evidence'" as "'an unfortunate choice of 
terminology for the sort of proof needed to establish a "mixed-
motives" case.'"  Ostrowski, 968 F.2d at 181 (quoting Tyler v. 
Bethlehem Steel Corp., 958 F.2d 1176, 1185 (2d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 113 S. Ct. 82 (1992)).3  According to Ostrowski, there is 
typically no direct evidence because the decisionmaker is 
unlikely to admit that he fired an employee because of age or 
sex.  Id. at 181-82.  Ostrowski nevertheless recognizes that 
circumstantial evidence "tied directly to the alleged 
discriminatory animus" must be produced to justify a burden-
shifting instruction.  Id. at 182.  It described the 
circumstantial evidence that shows mixed-motives in a way that 
                     
3Despite Judge Kearse's criticism in Ostrowski of Justice 
O'Connor's use of the phrase "direct evidence" to distinguish the 
evidence needed to present a mixed-motives as opposed to a 
pretext case, it seems to us to be a convenient shorthand term. 
Of course, it is, in a sense, circumstantial, but it is not 
circumstantial in the same sense as the evidence that makes out a 
pretext case.  In a mixed-motives case the defendant condemns 
himself of invidious discrimination out of his own mouth or by 
his own overtly biased acts.  In a pretext case he lies or masks 
the reason for his act.  He is, like the serpent in Eden, more 
subtle. 
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shows it is different from the kind of "circumstantial evidence" 
that makes out a pretext case.  It said: 
For example, purely statistical evidence 
would not warrant such a charge; nor would 
evidence merely of the plaintiff's 
qualification for and availability of a given 
position; nor would "stray" remarks in the 
workplace by persons who are not involved in 
the pertinent decisionmaking process.  Those 
categories of evidence, though they may 
suffice to present a prima facie case under 
the framework set forth in [McDonnell 
Douglas] and [Burdine], and may indeed 
persuade the factfinder that the plaintiff 
has carried his or her ultimate burden of 
persuasion, would not suffice, even if 
credited, to warrant a Price Waterhouse 
charge.  If, however, the plaintiff's 
nonstatistical evidence is directly tied to 
the forbidden animus, for example policy 
documents or statements of a person involved 
in the decisionmaking process that reflect a 
discriminatory or retaliatory animus of the 
type complained of in the suit, that 
plaintiff is entitled to a burden-shifting 
instruction. 
 
 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 Absent evidence that could "fairly be said to 'directly 
reflect'" the alleged unlawful basis, the case should be treated 
as a pretext case.  Griffiths, 988 F.2d at 470. 
 It is clear, however, that "'[n]ot all evidence that is 
probative of discrimination will entitle the plaintiff to [shift 
the burden]' to the defendant under Price Waterhouse." Griffiths, 
988 F.2d at 470 (quoting Ostrowski, 968 F.2d at 181). The burden 
of persuasion shifts to the employer "only after the plaintiff 
ha[s] proven that her employer acted unlawfully," and not merely 
"on the basis of a prima facie showing."  Binder v. Long Island 
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Lighting Co., 933 F.2d 187, 192 n.1 (2d Cir. 1991); see also 
Schleiniger v. Des Moines Water Works, 925 F.2d 1100, 1101 (8th 
Cir. 1991) ("Simply because a discriminatory reason might be 
inferred from a prima facie case does not mean that a mixed 
motive case exists.").  Evidence establishing a prima facie case 
is not always sufficient to require or permit a mixed-motives 
burden shifting instruction.  Such a result would merge the two 
different theories, mixed-motives and pretext, into one cause of 
action.  Every pretext case would then require a mixed-motives 
instruction and that instruction would shift to the employer the 
production and persuasion burdens of negating any causal 
connection between the employer's action and illegal 
discrimination instead of requiring the employee to show pretext 
and to persuade the factfinder that illegal discrimination was 
the legal cause of the action against her.  See St. Mary's, 113 
S. Ct. at 2749.  As we noted in Griffiths, 988 F.2d at 471-72, 
the Supreme Court has taken great pains to differentiate between 
the two theories.  See, e.g., Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 245-
47. 
 Therefore, to the extent Hook argues that production of 
evidence sufficient to show a McDonnell Douglas/Burdine prima 
facie case is evidence of discrimination sufficient to warrant a 
mixed-motives instruction, we think she misstates the law.  See 
Griffiths, 988 F.2d at 470; see also Binder, 933 F.2d at 192 n.1. 
 Hook also argues that she was entitled to a Price 
Waterhouse charge because she produced the kind of evidence 
needed to require such charge.  We reject this argument. 
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 She relied on her own qualifications as well as 
McCann's offensive remarks about her blouse and her body.  With 
respect to qualifications, her performance reviews were largely 
negative.  Moreover, it was Ernst & Young's policy not to promote 
individuals like Hook who had failed to complete the CPA exam. 
Only the grandfather clause permitted Hook to advance as far as 
she did. 
 Ernst & Young was in the process of reducing its 
professional workforce in the tax field.  It dismissed sixteen 
professional tax employees in the relevant time period, twenty-
five percent of whom were women.  According to McCann, Hook was 
terminated simply because she was "the least good of those who 
were left."  Jt. App. at 452; cf. Wilson v. Firestone Tire & 
Rubber Co., 932 F.2d 510, 517 (6th Cir. 1991) ("a plaintiff whose 
employment position is eliminated in a corporate reorganization 
or work force reduction carries a heavier burden in supporting 
charges of discrimination than does an employee discharged for 
other reasons"). 
 As to the "sexual advances and indelicacies" allegedly 
made by McCann, Brief for Appellant at 21, isolated remarks are 
not enough under Price Waterhouse to warrant a mixed-motives 
burden shifting instruction.  McCann's statements were stray 
remarks.  Although they were made by a decisionmaker, there is no 
evidence they were related to the decision process.  They were 
temporally remote and they had nothing to do with Hook's job 
performance.   
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 Alternatively, Hook argues a mixed-motives charge was 
warranted because the evidence she produced was enough to show a 
male employee, Peter Stipanovich, was less qualified than she for 
the job she lost but he was retained.  This evidence merely 
supplies part of her McDonnell Douglas/Burdine prima facie case. 
For the same reasons, it is not direct evidence of mixed motives. 
 The evidence that showed a mixed-motives case in Price 
Waterhouse is different.  There, comments in the performance 
evaluations upon which the decisionmakers based their decision to 
terminate the plaintiff included impermissible sexual 
stereotypes,4 and they were an integral part of the decision 
process directly relating to the employer's assessment of its 
female employee's ability to interact with clients and perform 
her job.  Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 232-37.5  Similarly, in 
Tyler, another mixed-motives age discrimination case, the 
evidence presented included a statement by the defendant that its 
sales force was "getting too old," that the plaintiff was 
replaced by a younger employee and documentary evidence 
                     
4These comments included: (1) descriptions of Hopkins as 
"'macho'"; (2) a "suggestion that she 'overcompensated for being 
a woman'"; (3) advice "to take 'a course at charm school'"; and 
(4) criticism of her use of profanity "'because it's a lady using 
foul language.'"  Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 235.  The 
clincher for the plurality in Price Waterhouse was, however, the 
fact that a decisionmaker, while explaining to Hopkins why she 
was not given partnership, advised her that in the future she 
should "'walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more 
femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear 
jewelry.'"  Id. (citation omitted). 
5In Price Waterhouse the district court found that the employer 
had never disavowed reliance on these comments in the evaluations 
which plainly showed an illegal discriminatory animus against 
women.  Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 236-37. 
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indicating the defendant maintained a group called the "Young 
Tigers" from which the plaintiff was, by definition, excluded. 
Tyler, 958 F.2d at 1186-87; see also Ostrowski, 968 F.2d at 183 
(age discrimination case with "explicit evidence of . . . age-
based animus" such as decisionmakers' statements that "there is 
no way [a 60 year old employee] can contribute," that two ADEA-
protected employees hired by plaintiff should not have been hired 
and instead should have remained in retirement and that Ostrowski 
should be fired because he hired older employees). 
 McCann's remarks are insufficient to show that sexual 
bias tainted any employment decision he made.  None of the 
evidence concerning the termination of Hook nor the retention of 
Stipanovich is sufficient to show that a discriminatory animus 
against women existed at Ernst & Young when Hook was fired. 
Accordingly, the district court did not err in refusing to give a 
Price Waterhouse burden-shifting instruction in this case. 
 
V. 
 For the foregoing reasons, the order of the district 
court will be affirmed. 
